THE IMPACT OF DIRECTORS' REPUTATION ON TAX AGGRESSIVENESS: AN ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE IN INDONESIA BEFORE AND DURING COVID-19

Selly Kurniawati, Aulia Rahmadini, Alfa Rahmiati, Rieswandha Dio Primasatya

Abstract


ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh reputasi direksi terhadap agresivitas pajak, dengan mengeksplorasi dinamika tersebut sebelum dan selama pandemi Covid-19. Berdasarkan sampel 2.662 observasi dari perusahaan publik di Bursa Efek Indonesia (2017-2021), hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa pengaruh reputasi direksi tidaklah sederhana dan bergantung pada pengukurannya. Di satu sisi, pengukuran LnMULTIPLE berhubungan negatif dengan agresivitas pajak, mengindikasikan bahwa direksi dengan reputasi kuat justru menghindari strategi pajak yang agresif. Sebaliknya, pengukuran AVGMULTIPLE justru menunjukkan hubungan positif, yang menyiratkan bahwa reputasi yang lebih lemah dapat mendorong perilaku agresif dalam perpajakan. Lebih lanjut, studi ini mengungkap bahwa hubungan kompleks ini juga dipengaruhi oleh faktor kontekstual, dimana dampak reputasi direksi terbukti lebih signifikan sebelum periode pandemi. Temuan ini mempertegas peran kondisi situasional dalam membentuk perilaku pajak perusahaan. Kebaruan penelitian tidak hanya terletak pada penggunaan multi-pengukuran reputasi, tetapi juga pada analisis peran Return on Assets (ROA) dan pemeriksaan faktor disruptif seperti pandemi, sehingga memberikan perspektif yang lebih komprehensif dalam mempelajari dinamika perencanaan pajak.

Kata kunci: Reputasi Direksi, Agresivitas Pajak, Indonesia, Covid-19

ABSTRACT

This study examines the influence of board of directors' reputation on corporate tax aggressiveness, exploring this dynamic both before and during the Covid-19 pandemic. Using a sample of 2,662 firm-year observations from publicly listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2021, the analysis reveals that the effect of reputational capital is nuanced and depends on its measurement. Specifically, the LnMULTIPLE metric shows a significant negative relationship with tax aggressiveness, suggesting that directors with strong reputations are less inclined to engage in aggressive tax strategies. Conversely, the AVGMULTIPLE metric demonstrates a positive relationship, implying that a weaker reputational standing may correlate with a greater tendency for such behavior. Furthermore, the study finds that this complex relationship is shaped by contextual factors, as the influence of director reputation was more pronounced in the pre-pandemic period. The role of Return on Assets (ROA) was also found to be a significant factor in this interplay. These findings underscore the critical role of situational contexts in shaping corporate tax behavior. The novelty of this research lies in its multi-faceted exploration, employing diverse measurements of reputational capital, analyzing the moderating effect of ROA, and investigating the unique contextual factor of the Covid-19 pandemic, thereby offering a more comprehensive perspective on tax planning dynamics.

Keywords: Board of Directors' Reputation, Tax Aggressiveness, Indonesia, Covid-19.


Keywords


Board of Directors' Reputation; Tax Aggressiveness; Indonesia; Covid-19

References


Abbott, J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. (2004). Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(1), 69-87.

Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-67.

Aliani, K., & Zarai, M. A. (2012). Demographic diversity in the board and corporate tax planning in American firms. Business Management and Strategy, 3(1), 72-86.

Archambeault, D. S., DeZoort, F. T., & Hermanson, D. R. (2008). Audit committee incentive compensation and accounting restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), 965-992.

Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2012). The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1-2), 391-411.

Barford, V., & Holt, G. (2013). Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of 'tax shaming'. BBC News Magazine.

Baxter, P., & Cotter, J. (2009). Audit committees and earnings quality. Accounting and Finance, 49(2), 267-290.

Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Lapides, P. D. (2000). Fraudulent financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 14(4), 441-454.

Bédard, J., Marrakchi Chtourou, S., & Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), 13-35.

Bobek, D., Hageman, A., & Hatfield, R. (2010). The role of client advocacy in the development of tax professionals’ advice. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 32(1), 25-51.

Bobek, D., & Hatfield, R. (2004). Determinants of tax professionals’ advice aggressiveness and fees. Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research, 7, 27-52.

Brown, I., Steen, A., & Foreman, J. (2009). Risk management in corporate governance: A review and proposal. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(5), 546-558.

Bugeja, M., Rosa, R., & Lee, A. (2009). The influence of director reputation on the choice of auditor. Accounting and Finance, 49(3), 445-467.

Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). (2013). Aggressive tax planning. Retrieved from www.cra-arc.gc.ca.

Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L., & Riley, R. A. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(3), 365-384.

Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396-414.

Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. The Financial Review, 38(1), 33-53.

Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. J. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.

Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 448-474.

Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & McKee, M. (2004). Cross-cultural comparisons in tax compliance behavior. Working Paper.

Davis, A. K., Guenther, D. A., Krull, L. K., & Williams, B. M. (2016). Do socially responsible firms pay more taxes? The Accounting Review, 91(1), 47-68.

De Vlaminck, N., & Sarens, G. (2015). The relationship between audit committee characteristics and financial statement quality: Evidence from Belgium. Journal of Management and Governance, 19(1), 145-166.

Deloitte. (2016). Managing tax–balancing current challenge with future promise. The EYE, Amsterdam.

DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., Archambeault, D. S., & Reed, S. A. (2002). Audit committee effectiveness: A synthesis of the empirical audit committee literature. Journal of Accounting Literature, 21, 38-75.

Dhaliwal, D. S., Naiker, V., & Navissi, F. (2010). The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 787-827.

Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 61-82.

Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010). The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1163-1189.

Eagly, A. H., Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C., & van Engen, M. L. (2003). Transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles: A meta-analysis comparing women and men. Psychological Bulletin, 129(4), 569-591.

Eagly, A. H., Makhijani, M. G., & Klonsky, B. G. (1992). Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111(1), 3-22.

Ebrahim, A. (2007). Earnings management and board activity: An additional evidence. Review of Accounting and Finance, 6(1), 42-58.

Ernst & Young. (2014). Staying on course: A guide for audit committees.

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.

Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.

Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Wu, Q., & Yan, M. (2014). Are female CFOs less tax aggressive? Evidence from tax aggressiveness. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 36(2), 171-202.

Fredikson, A. (2018). The relationship between top management reputation and audit quality. Journal of Corporate Governance.

Guenther, D. A., Matsunaga, S. R., & Williams, B. M. (2017). Is tax avoidance related to firm risk? The Accounting Review, 92(1), 115-136.

Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2-3), 127-178.

Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009). What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 126-141.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.

Jiraporn, P., Kim, Y. S., & Davidson III, W. N. (2008). Multiple directorships and corporate diversification. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15(3), 418-435.

Johnson, S. G., Kasipillai, J., & Koh, T. S. (2012). Reputation and tax aggressiveness in the Asia Pacific region. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 21(1), 1-12.

Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 389-410.

Khurana, I. K., & Moser, W. J. (2009). Shareholder investment horizons and tax aggressiveness. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 35(1), 111-134.

Lisowsky, P., & Robinson, L. (2013). Corporate tax aggressiveness and managing risks. Working Paper.

McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., & Wang, D. (2012). Tax avoidance: Does tax-specific industry expertise make a difference? The Accounting Review, 87(3), 975-1003.

Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3), 167-198.

Smith, J. et al. (2018). The moderating role of ROA in director reputation and tax aggressiveness. Accounting Studies.

Timothy, L. (2010). Tax avoidance as a legal service. Tax Law Review.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.35906/jurakun.v12i2.2672

Article Metrics

Abstract view : 65 times
PDF (Bahasa Indonesia) - 61 times

Copyright (c) 2026 Selly Kurniawati, Aulia Rahmadini, Alfa Rahmiati, Rieswandha Dio Primasatya

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.